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This is a somewhat long introduction to two papers I wrote while 
attending a summer school at the University of Oxford in 2017. The 
papers are about two very great men of the early 20th century: T.E. 
Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, and David Lloyd 
George, the Swiss army knife of British politics for more than two 
decades.  
 
The papers need hardly any introduction. They are pretty much 
complete in themselves. I would, however, like to say a few words 
about the connection between The University of Akron and the 
University of Oxford which sent me to Oxford in the first place: the 
PPE major. Having done so much for me, and generally so little 
known by the student population at UA, I think it is worth much 
more attention.  
 
To show its significance, I’ll begin with a history of Oxford PPE. 
Then I’ll go into its adoption by other schools, including Akron. 
After this discussion will be the two papers I wrote at Oxford as part 
of the summer program.  
 
PPE 
 
In 1920, the University of Oxford established a new degree called 
“Modern Greats.” This degree program was supposed to provide an 
alternative for those studying to become part of the civil service, 
whose students, traditionally, studied medieval or classical topics, 
and came from private schools. But by getting rid of the requirement 
to know ancient Greek, Oxford also opened up the program to a 
whole host of public-educated students; the degree’s first informal 
name, in fact, was “Greats without Greek.”1  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Beckett, Andy. "PPE: The Oxford Degree That Runs Britain." The Guardian. February 23, 2017. Accessed April 26, 
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Modern Greats students would be studying a mixture of philsophy, 
political science, and economics. Their focus would be both on the 
historical development of those disciplines, but, more importantly, 
on the contemporary application of them to relevant issues. As The 
Guardian writes in its history of PPE, it was a degree that “engaged 
with the contemporary world…[producing] graduates better able to 
serve Britain and its empire.”2  
 
This new degree would be more “modern” not only because it 
focused on contemporary issues, but also because it was a more 
modern method of obtaining an education. It aimed to produce the 
competent generalist, 3 so to speak, whose greatest asset was an 
ability to quickly and thoroughly understand, analyze, and 
communicate broad swaths of information about almost any topic.  
 
At first, the degree was doubted to work.4 Many Oxford tutors 
thought it would be incoherent and useless. This was especially 
because it lacked a hard science component, notwithstanding its 
general vagueness and breadth. This lack of any sort of hard science 
is still one of the main criticisms of the degree, no matter how hard 
economics tries to become one.  
 
Almost from the beginning, the degree was attracting 
impressionable students with a yearning for political adventure. 
This was a self-perpetuating cycle: eager students come to study PPE 
would, in turn, be mesmerized by the young, enthusiastic PPE dons; 
would then find their own calling within the variety of the degree; 
and would then go out into the world to follow that calling, usually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Beckett, "PPE: The Oxford Degree That Runs Britain." 
3 Kelly, Jon. "Why Does PPE Rule Britain?" Bbc.com. September 1, 2010. Accessed April 26, 2018. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-11136511. 
4 Beckett, "PPE: The Oxford Degree That Runs Britain." 
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in the realm of politics (but also, prominently, the media).5 
Meanwhile, the success and visibility of PPE graduates was its own 
advertisement for the degree, and enrollment and notoriety 
continued to climb.6  
 
Today, the degree is considered somewhat of a factory for not only 
British, but international politicians, media moguls, journalists, 
bankers, historians, writers, and, in short, world figures.  
 
More than any other course at any other university, more than any 
revered or resented private school, and in a manner probably 
unmatched in any other democracy, Oxford PPE pervades British 
political life. … It also gives many of these public figures a shared 
outlook: confident, internationalist, intellectually flexible, and 
above all sure that small groups of supposedly well-educated, 
rational people, such as themselves, can and should improve 
Britain and the wider world.7 
 
In time, as the degree modernized even more and gained greater 
reputation, its name also changed. This new name is what it still 
goes by today: Philosophy, Political Science, and Economics.  
 
Strangely, however, PPE’s rise at Oxford has been mysterious. 
Though it commands respect and attention from the sheer number 
of politicians it produces, there is still no building to house the 
“department of PPE” (which also does not exist). Instead, there is 
only a somewhat nebulous “PPE committee” which meets, 
infrequently, “somewhere in one of the [Oxford] buildings,” 
according to British economist Andrew Graham. And though it is 
almost 100 years old now, there are still no senior tutors of PPE.8 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Nimmo, Joe. "Why Have so Many Prime Ministers Gone to Oxford University?" BBC News. October 05, 2016. 
Accessed April 26, 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-37500542. 
6 Kelly, "Why Does PPE Rule Britain?" 
7 Beckett, "PPE: The Oxford Degree That Runs Britain." 
8 Beckett, "PPE: The Oxford Degree That Runs Britain." 
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In all, it is a program which has somehow maintained its youth and 
perpetual newness despite its rise to what now might be considered 
an established tradition for Britain’s ruling elite. Lots of this must be 
attributed to the degree’s focus on contemporary issues – there will 
never be a time when the study of current events is not “current,” so 
to speak. But PPE’s continued prominence must also be attributed to 
its breadth; it is not often, in a higher education world of increasing 
specialization, that any one course of study provides such flexbility 
as to what is actually studied; this flexibility, in turn, allows students 
to study what they want, rather than what they must, which is a 
constant source of excitement.  
 
PPE’s Expansion 
 
The closest match to Oxford PPE, in terms of consistently producing 
future politicians and other public figures, is Harvard University’s 
John F. Kennedy School of Government. There, students go through 
a course that emphasizes breadth, contemporary events, and the 
merging of many social disciplines, just like at Oxford.  
 
Many universities around the world, however, have adopted an 
eponymous PPE course of study, regardless of whether they’d like to 
become the next factory for world politicians. In many ways, this is 
the main proof of the standalone value of the degree, distinct from 
the value of notoriety which the graduates of only one university, 
albeit the founding university, has produced over the years.  
 
Many of the universities which have adopted PPE have not done so 
with a dedicated program, either. Instead, they will concoct a 
curriculum filled with classes of various disciplines, with specific 
elective requirements for each department within that curriculum. 
	   Morgan 6 
The degree truly becomes, then, an interdisciplinary course of study; 
students bounce around from department to department, learning 
things not directly related to, but perfectly relatable to, their other 
courses; and in the end, they must form their own judgments about 
how the information fits together, and how it must be used.  
 
This is the case at The University of Akron, where PPE maintains a 
small but consistent flow of graduates. The degree is housed under 
the Department of Philosophy, but has designated advisors in each 
of the three departments. There are certain requirements for each 
discipline that are mostly the same as the requirements for freshman 
and sophomore students in those disciplines individually. 
Afterward, however, PPE branches off, and allows flexibility in its 
upper-electives.  
 
Like many undergraduates, I was very hesitant to commit to any one 
course of study. I never knew if it was the “right” one; or if, in a 
couple years, I might deeply regret my choice, but not be able to 
change it for fear of falling behind. The oft-repeated advice I 
received – don’t worry so much about your major, you’ll end up 
doing something else anyway – was also not doing any good. It was 
impossible at the time to see that far in the future.  
 
When I learned of it, PPE seemed to be the remedy to most of those 
concerns. It combined the math, analytics, and broad practical 
concepts of economics with the topicality of politics and the wisdom 
of philosophy. And as I progressed through the major, I quickly 
learned that this breadth, rather than thinning the major, makes it 
much more valuable: it adds the component of connection between 
the disciplines, the making of which is entirely the task of the 
student.  
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For a senior capstone course, Akron’s PPE program suggests 
students go to Oxford for a summer program in History, Politics, and 
Society, through Oxford’s Department of Continuing Education. 
Though “HPS” is not necessarily PPE – it is very close. And that is 
the link that connects Oxford, the founder of PPE, with Akron, a 
disciple of PPE, the result of which, for me, were the papers below.  
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#2 
The Importance of T.E. Lawrence as 
Guerrilla Leader 
[Reformatted to the style of this document.]
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It will be difficult to write anything about T.E. Lawrence that has not 
been written. I hesitate to give a history, detailed or general, of his 
Arabian exploits; there are enough of those. I hesitate to attempt any 
new analysis of his tactics; they are clear, they are logical, and they 
worked. What I can do is tell how and for whom he was important as 
a guerrilla leader: First for the British, for a paradoxical reason. Then 
for the Arabs, for two key decisions early in their Revolt. Then for 
the success of the Revolt, through his understanding of guerrilla 
tactics and strategy. Next for the Great War, for one main reason. 
And finally for himself, for personal reasons.  
 
T.E. Lawrence was and still is a mystifying character. By the qualities 
of his mind and the construction of his character he would appear 
almost destined for fame, regardless of his profession. It is fortunate 
for the world and for the Arabs that his early experiences led him to 
the Middle East. If he had not half the love he claims to have had for 
Arabic culture, land, and people – which began on a trip to Syria 
when an undergraduate and developed more fully when an 
archeologist in that same region9 – there is no possibility things 
would have turned out as they did. Great Britain was the first to see 
this and take advantage of it.  
 
It was Britain’s priority to win on the Western front; its interest to 
defeat the Ottoman Turks and join Russian forces on Germany’s 
flank; its fear to initiate any hostilities outside the European 
theater.10 An Arab rising against the Turks might satisfy the latter 
two but, when the Sharif of Mecca did declare the Revolt in 1916, 
swiftly taking over Mecca and advancing on Medina, things went 
bad quickly. Lawrence, noted for his work in the Cairo intelligence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9Jeremy Wilson, “Formative Years,” in Lawrence of Arabia, ed. Jeremy Wilson et al. (United Kingdom: Sutton 
Publishing Limited, 1998), 1-19.   
10James Barclay, “T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt: Innovation and irregular warfare” (M.A. thesis, Central 
Missouri State University, 1991), 7.	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office and his familiarity with the Arabic culture and language, was 
sent to assess the situation; Britain, wanting badly the revolt to 
succeed, asked Lawrence to determine who might be its leader, and 
how he might win.  
 
This was the beginning of Lawrence’s path to becoming the British-
Arab liaison, after which he always, if not always openly or willingly, 
and simultaneously as military adviser of the Arab irregulars under 
Prince Feisal, worked for Britain’s benefit: drawing the Ottomans 
from the war through an Arab uprising, and establishing British 
presence in areas which, post-war, were Britain’s desire to control. 
Yet, paradoxically, he worked so well for British interests precisely 
because he opposed them.  
 
Lawrence wanted the Revolt to do two things. First, naturally, to 
defeat the Turks. Second, to make sure no other imperial power 
stepped in to fill the vacuum created by the Turks’ absence. The first 
of these goals was normal and aligned with British interest. The 
second of these goals was radical and directly opposed British 
interest.11 Yet without someone as passionate as Lawrence for giving 
the Arabs independence – if the Arabs knew they were fighting only 
to be split up and sold off to other imperial powers after the war – it 
is doubtful that the Revolt would have worked as well as it did, or 
perhaps have been successful at all.  
 
Lawrence thought there were three elements to the guerrilla 
strategy. I will discuss them as they come up. Here it is fit to 
introduce the third element: the psychological element. Lawrence 
says this element 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia (United Kingdom: Sutton Publishing Limited, 1998), 21-23. 
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concerns the crowd, the adjustment of spirit to the point where it 
becomes fit to exploit in action. It considers the capacity for mood 
of the men, their complexities and mutability, and the cultivation 
of what in them profits the intention.12 
 
The psychological element deals with the enigma of men’s minds 
and human motivation. A successful leader, which Lawrence was, 
must give his followers something worth fighting for, and a man 
worth fighting under. For the Arab irregulars it was “at least some 
feeling of semi-independence, or the comfort of knowing that they 
were in the fight.”13 Lawrence was able to do this because he felt the 
same motivation as them. For Lawrence, as for the Arabs, the Revolt 
was for freedom from the Turks, and with this he won the Arabs’ 
hearts and minds and trust. For Britain there was nothing better 
than such a man, and with different intentions they desired, and 
achieved, the same goal.  
 
Lawrence also, in a later essay, discussed the personal aspects of 
assimilating with the Arabs, of being a successful leader and adviser 
among them. His “27 Articles” of advice center around one theme: 
stay out of the way and let the Arabs think they are doing their own 
fighting and planning. Don’t noticeably become their leader; they 
must have their own fight; they must win their own fight for 
themselves. If Lawrence advocated detachment in war, he also 
advocated it in personal relations: “Do not try to do too much with 
your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it 
perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for 
them.”14 Lawrence was a master of the psychological element of 
guerrilla warfare.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12Lawrence, T.E. “T.E. Lawrence on guerrilla warfare.” brittanica.com. https://www.britannica.com/topic/T-E-
Lawrence-on-guerrilla-warfare-1984900 (accessed July 13, 2017).  
13Barclay, “T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt.” 24.  
14Lawrence, T.E. “The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence.” wwi.lib.byu.edu. 
https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_27_Articles_of_T.E._Lawrence (accessed July 13, 2017).	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As for the Arabs, Lawrence was crucial for making two strategic 
decisions early in the Revolt. After the irregulars had captured 
Mecca and were advancing on the outskirts of Medina – the Revolt 
having officially begun – things went stale. The Arabs could not get 
into Medina, and the Turks were bringing in reinforcements from 
up north in preparation for an attack on Mecca, to retake the city. 
Time ran down quickly. The British high command thought, to save 
the Revolt, Medina must be taken. This was typical of “many of the 
[British] strategic decisions of WWI...firmly rooted in the tenets and 
theories of...Clausewitz.”15  
 
Lawrence saw when no one else did the mistake in this thinking. At 
any cost the Turks should be kept in Medina, not driven out. If the 
Arab irregulars could disrupt the flow of Turkish troops and 
supplies from the north, the existing forces at Medina likely would 
not advance down to Mecca. Not only this, but the Medina troops 
would also be isolated from the rest of the Turkish army, and spend 
their time defending a useless city, rather than consolidating their 
hold on the Hejaz.16  
 
As there was only one Hejaz rail line connecting Turkish forces up 
north with those in Medina, all the Arabs needed to do was 
frequently disrupt the line north of the city. The disruptions need 
not be major; in fact, the smaller and quicker the better. Constant 
and clandestine disruption, such as blowing small portions of track 
or raiding supply cars, was better than fighting troops – the “attack 
need be...directed not against [the enemy’s] men, but against his 
materials: so it should not seek for his main strength or his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15Barclay, “T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt.” 4. 
16Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia, 44.  
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weaknesses, but for his most accessible material.”17 Eventually the 
irregulars, with help from a British naval assault on the coast of the 
Red Sea, were able to take a key city, Wejh, which could act as a base 
for Arab guerrilla operations, and a center for British supply 
throughout the Hejaz. This was a brilliant strategy coming straight 
from Lawrence’s unconventional suggestion.18 For the Turks, it was 
nearly impossible to defend. 
 
Here it is fit to introduce another of Lawrence’s elements: the 
algebraic element. This encompasses all the “known variables, fixed 
conditions, space and time, inorganic things like hills and climates 
and railways” of guerrilla fighting, all the “essentially formulable” 
aspects.19 Raiding the Hejaz rail line mainly consisted of this. The 
Arabs, suffering little to no real danger, could precisely disrupt the 
Turkish flow of supplies to Medina with disproportionately effective 
results. Lawrence would maintain this strategy – fighting the 
enemy’s materials, not the enemy – throughout the Revolt.  
 
Later on Lawrence, in line with the algebraic element, calculated 
specifically what it would have taken for the Turks to control the 
Arab guerrilla threat. He figured that, of the 100,000 square miles of 
the Hejaz, the Turks would need a post every four square miles. 
With each post containing no fewer than 20 men, the Turks would 
need nearly 600,000 men – or 500,000 more than they had in total. 
Indeed, it surprisingly seemed that “the assets in this sphere were 
with the Arabs, and climate, railways, deserts, technical weapons 
could also be attached to their interests.”20 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17Lawrence, T.E. “T.E. Lawrence on guerrilla warfare.” brittanica.com. 
18Barclay, “T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt.” 24.  
19Lawrence, T.E. “T.E. Lawrence on guerrilla warfare.” brittanica.com.  
20Lawrence, T.E. “T.E. Lawrence on guerrilla warfare.” brittanica.com. 
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The second of Lawrence’s key strategic decisions in the Revolt came 
right after Wejh. With the Turks successfully isolated at Medina, 
with Mecca under control, with British reinforcements at Wejh and 
with the Hejaz rail line in the Arabs’ pockets, Lawrence saw now that 
the Revolt must use its advantage and spread north – this also before 
the British launched a traditional ground campaign up the 
Mediterranean coast, which, succeeding, would take the “Arab” 
victory out of the Revolt, which Lawrence so fervently believed was 
needed for the Arabs to become independent, if successful.  
 
However, to spread north into Lebanon, Palestine and Syria, the 
Revolt would need more supplies.21 Lawrence here devised another 
unconventional plan: take control of Akaba, the fishing village on 
the northernmost point of the Red Sea, which through a strongly-
guarded mountain pass led northeastward to Maan, a strategic 
Turkish stronghold. If all three – Akaba, Maan, and the pass 
between them – could be gotten, Britain would have greater ability 
to supply the Arabs, and the Arabs greater ability to launch 
operations and spread the Revolt north, eventually reaching 
Damascus. But how to do so.  
 
Around this time there was…a discernible change in [Lawrence’s] 
tactical approach…heretofore, the Arab irregulars had been 
employed to support the...British preference for coastal operations. 
Lawrence redirected the guerrilla operations to penetrate further 
inland and exercise more of a disruptive force against the Turkish 
lines of communication.22 
 
Akaba would be taken from inland, not from the coast; Maan would 
be attacked first, and if this action “was decisive, the rest would be 
easy.” And all of it would happen by complete surprise.23  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia, 46.  
22Barclay, “T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt.” 25. 
23Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia, 47.	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The strategy worked, and it was only a matter of time until the 
Revolt, maintaining to the end its guerrilla tactics devised by 
Lawrence, and backed by Britain’s traditional maneuvers up the 
coast, spread north into Damascus.  
 
These were two of the key decisions Lawrence made to help the 
Arabs and their Revolt (and Britain, as its goal at this point was to 
defeat the Turks as well). Through the rest of the Revolt Lawrence 
devised the same tactics and used the same strategy: a “war of 
detachment…[containing] the enemy by the silent threat of a vast 
unknown desert, not disclosing themselves till the moment of 
attack”; effectively, “never engaging the enemy at all,”24 and certainly 
never giving the enemy a target at which to shoot. Raids, hit-and-
runs, surprise attacks, quick withdrawal, logistical disruption, 
perfect intelligence, owning the initiative – these would give the 
Arabs the means to win. Passive defense, over-extension, uncertain 
communications and reinforcements – these would be the downfall 
of the Turks.  
 
And here can be introduced the last of Lawrence’s elements: the 
biological element, or the “humanity in battle.”25 This element deals 
“nine-tenths [with] the tactics of battle; one-tenth [with] the 
commander’s competence and ability to lead intelligently and 
persuasively; to assess and control situations, to respond to and plan 
for attack.”26 Lawrence was the man for both. As Arab military 
adviser he was able to both devise tactics and implement them. It 
was, as shown, his suggestions which led to the unconventional yet 
successful strategy in Wejh and Akaba, and it was his suggestions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24Lawrence, T.E. “T.E. Lawrence on guerrilla warfare.” brittanica.com. 
25Lawrence, T.E. “T.E. Lawrence on guerrilla warfare.” brittanica.com. 
26Barclay, “T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt.” 32. 
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and guidance which would dictate the guerrilla tactics of the Arab 
irregulars as a whole.  
 
The Arabs were not equipped to fight conventional, Clausewitz-like 
warfare. First because they were, until the outbreak of the Revolt, 
under Turkish control. A regular army could not be built up in such 
circumstances. Second because they were still a tribal, hyper-
factious group of people. In fact, commanders of the Arab irregulars 
had to be very careful not to mix certain tribes in their raids and 
missions, for fear that the soldiers would not get along well enough 
to carry them out – or worse, would perform sabotage. But the Arabs 
did have something. They could raid. They knew how to raid. They 
had been practicing it on other tribes for hundreds and hundreds of 
years. They were skilled horsemen and skilled looters and skilled 
raiders. They had the tactics; all they needed was the strategy. The 
man with the strategy was Lawrence. He saw the peculiar Arab 
propensity for guerrilla warfare, and exploited it to a larger strategy 
that would complete the Revolt. Guerrilla tactics were nothing new 
for them. What was new was that a commander and military adviser 
like Lawrence could so effectively use the “biological” element of 
guerrilla to his advantage.27  
 
Lawrence would later write that, at the time, military opinion “was 
obsessed by the dictum of Foch that the ethic of modern war is to 
seek for the enemy’s army, his centre of power, and destroy it in 
battle,” but that the Arabs were both incapable and unwilling to do 
that, as they “would not attack positions and so they seemed to [the 
British] incapable of forcing a decision.”28 So Lawrence needed to 
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adapt, as successful leaders must. And if the Arabs could not be – to 
their benefit – “modern,” could they not at least be  
 
an influence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or 
back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile 
as a whole, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. 
The Arabs might be a vapour, blowing where they listed...29 
 
This is a threat ever more dangerous and ever more menacing than a 
conventional force fighting conventional battles. More, it perfectly 
suited the abilities and capabilities of the Arabs. The key was having 
the initiative. With the initiative, the Arabs controlled the pace and 
direction of Turkish defense, which, kept always on its guard, was 
wasting remarkable amounts of men and supplies to defend against 
this gas-like, intangible influence. Lawrence showed his brilliance 
and competence in being able to adapt himself not only personally, 
to the Arab way of life, but strategically, to the Arab way of war, and 
as such was invaluable to the success of the Revolt. 
 
I have shown how, for a paradoxical reason, Lawrence was 
important to the British; for two key reasons, to the Arabs at the 
beginning of the Revolt; and to the success of the Revolt, for his 
understanding and application of guerrilla warfare throughout. 
Now, as a sort of addendum, I will explain why he was so important 
as a guerrilla leader in two more aspects: for the Allied cause in the 
Great War, and for himself.  
 
The Allies concentrated most of their attention on the Western 
front. Yet a victory on the periphery was not unwanted. By late 1917 
British and Egyptian forces under General Edmund Allenby were 
smashing up the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, attacking from 
the water with their navy and from land with their regular armies. 	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The Arabs, much further inland, were wreaking logistical and 
strategic havoc on the Turks’ right flank, disrupting 
communications, looting supplies, confining and isolating Turkish 
troops, and in any way possible causing hell for Turkish 
operations.30  
 
On Oct. 1, 1918, the Allies entered Damascus. Later that month the 
Ottoman Empire signed the Armistice of Mudros. Not long after, on 
November 9, Kaiser William II abdicated. The downfall of the 
Central Powers came in a rush, with the success of the Arab Revolt 
and the defeat of the Turkish forces near the beginning.31 The 
“sideshow of a sideshow,”32 as Lawrence (perhaps too humbly) once 
characterized the Arab Revolt, was crucial to the total Allied victory.  
 
I will finish with a short discussion of the importance of Lawrence as 
a guerrilla leader – to himself: 
 
All men dream: but not equally. Those who dream by night in the 
dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was 
vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they 
may act their dream with open eyes, to make it possible.33 
 
From this passage of his major work Lawrence is quite obviously 
speaking about himself. Since a child, those around him noticed an 
“unusually strong will-power, often employed to achieve feats of 
strength and endurance.”34 At Oxford, he went above and beyond 
what he was required as an undergraduate, even contributing 
original archeological finds to the Ashmolean museum. His digging 	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in Syria was successful and relevant. His reports at the Cairo 
Intelligence Office were exceptionally perceptive, cogent and 
thorough. Everyone who ran into him seemed unable to forget him. 
And, after his success in the Middle Eastern theater during WWI, he 
was able to achieve “his enduring ambition...to be a writer,” with the 
success of his “Seven Pillars of Wisdom” and several other military 
and autobiographical works. The mythic sobriquet by which he is 
known today – “Lawrence of Arabia” – was popularized during his 
life.35  
 
No matter how much he later deprecated or humbled the legacy of 
his work in Arabia, no matter how much he tried, once famous, to 
escape fame and live inconspicuously, and no matter how many 
psychological problems with which he left (or entered) the war, men 
such as himself are most important to themselves. It is my opinion 
that, as a guerrilla leader, T.E. Lawrence was most important to 
himself, for it was his experiences and recognition in the Middle 
Eastern theater of WWI which gave him the pad from which to 
launch his ambitions, and the reputation to achieve them. That more 
than anything else was important to him. For one who so badly 
wants fame and fulfillment, the means by which he gets them are 
infinitely precious.  
 
As for Lawrence’s military legacy, as one author writes, his most 
important achievement was not “crafting a template” for guerrilla 
warfare – guerrilla warfare has been around as long as warfare – but 
his own example of “how hard any soldier fighting an irregular war 
must work to understand and adapt himself to local conditions.”36 
And so for the British, for the Arabs, for the success of the Revolt, for 
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the Allied victory in the war, and for himself – he was absolutely 
imperative as a guerrilla leader. 
	   Morgan 21 
#3 
WWI Party Politics: Winners and Losers 
[Reformatted to the style of this document.]
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Nearly every paper on the fall of the British Liberal Party preempts 
its inconclusiveness with the excuse that others, too, find the topic 
equally inconclusive and, at any rate, unmanageably complicated. 
Now there are even scholars studying the history of scholars 
studying the history of 1916, that all-important year for any 
understanding of the Liberal decline. Some think they know the 
exact reasons. It is more likely that, as one scholar has it, “Liberal 
politics of the past has no future,” and it must remain simply “a 
subject of historical inquiry – and of intense debate among 
historians – for many years to come…[emerging] as one of those 
permanently fascinating ‘Problems’ [sic] of history.”37 I will not 
attempt to explain precisely why the Liberal party broke as it did. It 
did. What I will attempt to explain is why the split was so damaging 
to the party’s future, and why, when the Liberals fared so poorly, the 
Conservative and Labour Parties fared so well during and after 
WWI.  
 
Most of the Liberal Party’s problems start and end with David Lloyd 
George, the wonderfully powerful yet strangely corrupting figure 
who weaved in and out of the heights of British politics before, 
during and after the war. Yet there are some who find historians and 
researchers much too interested in him, and who think that, before 
investigating the personalities of the era, one should look at how 
structural changes in the British government could explain the 
Liberals’ decline. So I will start with that. Then I will discuss the split 
in the party between Lloyd George and Herbert Henry Asquith. Next 
I will talk about Labour; then the Conservatives; then the post-war 
election; and, finally, the final defeat of the Liberals.  
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Often changes in the British electorate are used to explain the rise of 
the Labour Party more than the fall of the Liberal Party, but they can 
be used to do the latter. The Representation of the People Act of 1918 
tripled the electorate and allowed a certain subpopulation of women 
to vote.38 For various reasons, as some scholars argue, the Liberals 
seemed particularly attached to the “political community” of 1867-
1914. After 1918’s enfranchisement, the new electorate was not only 
“divided by class in a way that increasingly excluded the Liberals, 
but it was less likely to respond to policies that demanded a 
comparatively high level of political intelligence,”39 as did most of 
the issues on which Liberals focused. Also, because of their 
somewhat close alliance on broader issues, many voters, even “dyed-
in-the-wool Tories, who had voted Conservative since getting the 
franchise,” were now talking “not ‘Liberal’ but ‘Labour.’”40    
 
What is more popular to discuss is the split between Asquith, who 
led a Liberal and then a coalition government for the first half of the 
war, and Lloyd George, who moved to multiple different positions in 
Asquith’s government before superseding him as prime minister in 
1916.  
 
Unlike the event of Asquith’s resignation, his reasons for making a 
coalition cabinet in the early months of 1915 are somewhat clear. He 
was influenced to compose the coalition, originally, to keep the 
political truce with Unionists he had declared at the start of the 
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war.41 This is how the Conservatives came onto the scene. Once 
there, they were free to pull political maneuvers in any fashion they 
wanted. Indeed, as the war progressed, Asquith was proving more 
and more vulnerable to attack by the press and, “as time passed 
without victory, his hold weakened on what he knew was a 
discontented Liberal party”42 – the only thing keeping his coalition 
together.  
 
Multiple factors hastened Asquith’s eventual fall. One was the 
omnipresent force of Lloyd George, then at the War Office, who was, 
along with being generally discontented with Asquith’s leadership, 
indirectly pressuring Asquith to form a small War Cabinet, no more 
than three to five men, that could run day-to-day war operations 
more expediently. Lloyd George would head the War Cabinet – and 
Asquith would not even be a member. When this got out to the press 
it was political humiliation, and Asquith’s reputation, already 
declining, dropped further.  
 
The Conservatives, most notably Edward Carson, Bonar Law and 
Arthur Balfour,43 saw a better leader in Lloyd George, and 
maneuvered for him to replace Asquith. Though one notable 
historian thinks it was on the “protean issue [of labor union 
dilution], not on pre-existing rivalries or ideological divergence,” 
that Asquith’s alliance with Lloyd George broke, this does not 
account for the strong Conservative preference of George over 
Asquith, nor with George’s quite obvious disillusionment over 
Asquith’s running of the war, nor with the general sentiment that 
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“Lloyd George, for all his faults, provided a dynamic leadership 
which the stolid Asquith never achieved.”44  
 
And so, “the victim of neither sudden national crisis nor adverse vote 
in the House of Commons,”45 Asquith resigned in 1916, taking most 
of the Liberal members of the coalition cabinet with him. Lloyd 
George was soon after made prime minister, and the Liberal Party 
was split open.  
 
If Lloyd George wasn’t a problem for the Liberal Party before, he 
was now. Elevated to the premiership by Conservatives, George 
“never forgot whom he had to please,”46 and showed this by 
reconfiguring the coalition cabinet in the Conservatives’ favor. Here 
was the sign of a definite and divisive rift in the Liberal Party: the 
Asquith supporters and the George supporters; that is, those who 
could stand the “‘illiberalism’ of Lloyd George’s coalition,” and those 
who maintained “loyalty...to Liberal principles which had been 
made almost irrelevant by the impact of total war.”47 
 
Regardless of the faltering support of his own party, Lloyd George 
proved a competent and successful leader in time of war. Along with 
finally setting up his small War Cabinet, he is remembered for 
quickly and effectively directing the efforts of the nation’s industry 
and labor to supplying the war effort. For this he had to form a sort 
of alliance, or at any rate working relationship, with the trade 
unions, whose support was critical to his goals of expediency and 
efficiency; the shortage of labor had already put the unions in a 
strong bargaining position, giving them the initiative in negotiating 
with the government, rather than the government the initiative in 	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dealing with the unions.48 And with the success of these dealings, 
George corrected one of the main faults of the Asquithian cabinet: its 
inability and unwillingness to “exercise effective control of the 
direction of the war effort.”49  
 
Yet George’s newfound affinity for unions bolstered the unions’ 
power and influence, which, it must be remembered, provided 
funding and support to the Labour Party. It is one of the many 
paradoxes of the time that Lloyd George, himself a Liberal, was one 
of the main factors in elevating the Labour Party, which would 
ultimately displace his own party. At the start of the war there were 
around four million trade union members nationwide; at the end of 
the war there were around eight million, which numbers give a sort 
of unorthodox numerical representation of the increase of union, 
and also Labour, power.50 “Waiting in the wings,” one author writes, 
the Labour Party “came out of the war in a very strong political 
position,” both because of its increased influence under the moves of 
Lloyd George, and because “it bore no responsibility for either the 
causes or the effects of the [the war].”51  
 
The electoral reform act, mentioned above, also played a large part 
in increasing Labour support. And this for a very simple reason: the 
newly enfranchised male population (a large portion of the new 
electorate) was, by its demographics, naturally part of the Labour 
constituency, and would vote for that party in the next election.52  
 
Further easing Labour’s path to the top was the split in the Liberal 
Party. With support divided between Asquith and Lloyd George (or 
neither), their party, as will be shown, could not muster sufficient 	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votes to give a purely Liberal government any sort of mandate. And 
with the two parties’ close alliance on many issues, the Liberal divide 
– so pronounced that the Liberals seemed “more intent on fighting 
each other than winning Parliamentary elections”53 – nearly assured 
“the supplanting of the Liberals by Labour as the anti-Conservative 
party in modern politics.”54 
 
The precise standing of the Liberal Party at the time was revealed in 
an event known now as the “Maurice Debate,” which happened in 
May of 1918. Through a somewhat complicated procedure, Asquith 
made his “one faltering bid as a real leader of the Opposition” by 
getting a vote of confidence in Lloyd George. The plan backfired, 
however, when the results came in: 70 Liberals supported George’s 
coalition, 100 voted with Asquith, and 85 abstained. George survived, 
but only with “massive Conservative support.”55 This showed not 
only how dependent was Lloyd George on the Conservatives, which 
in itself would alienate more Liberals; not only how even was the 
split, which promised to keep the Liberals dividedly weak; but also 
that, far from only two alternatives, a large number of Liberals 
supported neither leader, and “the truth was that the Liberal party 
was divided into three parts.”56 
 
Now, surely, it was proven that “Asquith offered no coherent 
alternative to the Lloyd George coalition,”57 and with a rising Labour 
Party and an intact Conservative Party, the Liberals were doomed.  
 
Here I will make a short note about the Conservatives. Since their 
inclusion in the first coalition government under Asquith, they had 
been in a particularly influential position. Succeeding in removing 	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Asquith, they then placed Lloyd George – who, dependent on their 
support, was rightly seen by some as a Conservative puppet – in the 
premiership, a man they could count on to do as they wished, and 
yet on whom they could put the fault when, and if, things went sour. 
After all, he was a Liberal and he was the leader; any leader, ideally, 
has ultimate responsibility, and this must have been a very 
comforting fact for Conservative ministers. They could trail and take 
credit for his successes; they could hide behind and blame him for 
his failures, if needed. As one scholar writes, “the Conservative 
hierarchy not only elevated Lloyd George to the premiership, but 
sustained him through the remaining years of the war and the 
reconstruction.”58 
 
A few months after the Maurice Debate, the Central Powers 
collapsed. The Allies proved victorious, and the main question 
facing the leader of Parliament now was whether to return to normal 
party politics or try to extend the wartime coalition into peacetime. 
George, knowing well the reality of his precarious position in 
between the Liberal and Conservative Parties, went for the latter 
option, and called a general election. Still at this time Asquith was in 
control of the “bulk of the regular party machinery.” Yet for such a 
divided Liberal Party, that did not amount to much. Besides, the 
press supported George, and George’s newfound reputation as “the 
man who won the war” propped him up as a desirable leader – but a 
leader in his own right, and not necessarily of any one party.59  
 
The odds seemed to favor George and, as it turned out, did. The 
results were decisive. Coalitionists, with Conservative coalitionists 
providing the overwhelming majority of support, destroyed their 
competition. Labour came out as the Official Opposition. The 	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Asquithian (Asquith himself did not get a seat) or abstaining Liberals 
were reduced to parliamentary inconsequence, and from this point 
on would never make a major return to British politics. The fall of 
the Liberal Party was nearly complete, with only Lloyd George 
hanging on as its last, and awfully spurious, crusader. 
 
The 1918 election was especially damaging for Liberals in another 
way. When Lloyd George and his coalitionist props began sending 
out “coupons” to men looking for a seat in the House, effectively 
ensuring a seat for those who got one and denying a seat to those 
who didn’t, they were looking for those who had, in the past, showed 
their loyalty to the coalition and to George. The votes cast in the 
Maurice Debate were a heavy indication of “past loyalty and future 
allegiance,”60 and so the coupons went largely on those lines. For his 
personal benefit Lloyd George might deny Asquithian Liberals a 
coupon, but in doing so he would be stamping into the ground the 
very party that had brought him up in the past, and which might 
have been salvaged for the future. 
 
The 1918 general election was, in reality, the sure defeat for the 
Liberal Party; though the final defeat came when Lloyd George, after 
a scandal of selling honors, was ousted in 1922. At this time, the 
government was back to “discovering its centre of gravity in the 
Conservative majority which has always been its mainstay,”61 and 
Labour had already come up as the Official Opposition.  
 
It is possible that the Liberal Party was doomed before the war 
began. Indeed, many scholars argue that “within the [pre-war] 
Liberal government, those who had held office since 1906 were 
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undoubtedly stale.”62 Yet, if anything, the war and the post-war era 
only hastened its decline, what with its mixture of electoral reform; 
the rise of a new and similar party laden with an increased voter 
base and greater bargaining ability; the maintenance of an old party 
that, clandestinely, pulled the strings on most of the major 
maneuvers of wartime politics; the near-equal divide of support 
between two strong, Liberal leaders; the exigencies of a post-war 
election based on prior loyalty; and, last but not least, the 
disappearance of its last leader, Lloyd George, in 1922. All that may 
be said conclusively about this topic has already been written: “The 
literature on the rise and fall of the Liberal Party is voluminous and 
inconclusive.”63 I trust this paper keeps with the tradition.  
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